This paper investigates the value of umbrella branding and how it is changing in response to a large increase in consumer information provided by online reputation mechanisms. Theory suggests much of the value of umbrella branding results from asymmetric information between buyers and sellers. As more information becomes available, consumers should rely less on brand names as quality signals and the ability for firms to extend reputations across heterogenous products or services should decrease. To examine this empirically, this paper combines a large, 15 year panel of hotel revenues with millions of online reviews from multiple platforms. I find that branded, or chain-affiliated, hotels earn substantially higher revenues than equivalent independent hotels, but that this premium has declined by over 50% from 2000 to 2015. I find that this can be largely attributed to an increase in online reputation mechanisms, and that this affect is largest for low quality and small market firms. Using numerous measures of the information content of online reviews, increases in this information have increased independent hotel revenue substantially more than chain hotel revenue. Finally, the correlation between firm revenue and brand-wide reputation is decreasing and the correlation with individual hotel reputation is replacing it. * UCLA Anderson School of Management, contact brett.hollenbeck@gmail.com. I wish to thank the Morisson Family Center for Marketing Research for generous funding.
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic change in both the nature of and amount of information available to consumers. Beginning in the mid-2000's, online reputation mechanisms like TripAdvisor, Yelp, and the reputation and reviews portions of Amazon, eBay, Alibaba and other retailers, have produced an influx of detailed information on the quality and attributes of goods and services. These new sources of information have potentially large implications for how consumers make choices. One implication is that consumers may rely less on traditional signals of quality like price, branding, and advertising.
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This study examines the implications of this information for business-format franchising and for umbrella branding more broadly. Branding exists in large part to provide a reliable signal of product quality.
2 In settings where there is asymmetric information between buyer and seller, branding allows sellers to establish reputations over many interactions. Firms may use umbrella branding to extend the reputations developed over past products to new products and services. The conditions under which brand extension can signal product quality have been explored theoretically (Moorthy (2012) ) and shown empirically (Erdem (1998) .)
A firm's reputation for quality is therefore costly and time-consuming to build and a major source of its value. Firms across industries invest large amounts of resources in developing their brand and reputation.
Business format franchising is widely used in retail and service industries and represents an important application of umbrella branding, generating sales responsible for over 3% of GDP in 2007 (Kosova and Lafontaine (2012) .) Under this model, a local entrepreneur typically owns and operates a business while licensing its brand and, in most circumstances, agreeing to purchase inputs and follow standard operating procedures. In return, the franchisee pays the franchisor a fixed fee and a share of revenue. Much of the benefit to the franchisee comes via licensing the brand name that, as described in Aaker (1995) , provides four benefits: awareness, perceived quality, specific mental associations, and loyalty. The first two of these rely on asymmetric information. This paper empirically examines three research questions. How have online reputation mechanisms affected the value of umbrella branding and business-format franchising? How is the relationship between online reputation mechanisms and brand value determined by vertical differentiation and market size? Finally, is chain reputation decreasing in importance and, if so, what are the implications of this for franchise contracts? I document that, as more information has become available, the value of branding has declined significantly. In addition there is substantial heterogeneity in the size of the effect determined by vertical differentiation and market size. Finally, brand-level reputation is declining as a predictor of firm performance and outlet-level quality is increasing as a predictor.
Much previous work on online reviews, including Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) , Chintagunta et al. (2010) , Duan et al. (2013) , and Zhang and Zhu (2010) , attempt to identify a causal effect of average online rating on outcomes like sales. Unlike this work, I do not study the effect of star rating on sales. In that context, average star rating's close relationship with underlying quality makes it difficult to identify a separate causal 1 The potential impacts of have been hypothesized at length in Simonson and Rosen (2014) and in the popular press (Surowiecki (2014) .)
2 Early theoretical work on brands emphasized the importance of and challenge of forming a reputation for quality (Shapiro (1983) ) and brands as a signal of quality (Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , Spence (1974) , Park et al. (1986) ).
effect. Instead, I take advantage of this relationship and treat star ratings as a useful measure of product quality and focus on the implications of increased product information on the gap in performance between branded and unbranded firms. I use a large, detailed panel to construct comprehensive measures of amount of information available through online reputation mechanisms and time-varying quality as revealed through online ratings.
The setting is the hotel industry, which is an ideal industry for considering these issues. It is a large and important sector whose product is an experience good. Historically, consumer information about specific hotel properties has been relatively low, often limited to the name, location and price, and perhaps a few lines in a guidebook. A hotel's brand name has been one of the most salient and important signals of its underlying quality. By contrast, beginning in the mid-2000's and growing rapidly since then, a number of widely used online platforms now offer highly detailed user-generated reviews and quality ratings.
3 The hotel industry offers other advantages as well; competition is primarily geographic and firms offer a single basic product, a night's stay in a room, that is differentiated primarily vertically and according to quality tiers widely agreed upon within the industry.
In addition, this setting features many independent firms that offer a useful counterfactual against which to measure the value of umbrella branding. Hereafter, I will refer to firms as branded if they are members of a regional or national chain. While independent hotels often do engage in advertising and branding, this paper is concerned with umbrella branding and the ability of firms to extend and link reputations across different products.
This study combines a large, 15 year, property-level panel of hotel revenues with roughly 1.5 million online reviews from multiple platforms. The empirical strategy is to take advantage of the changing level of online information available to consumers over time, markets, and firms to measure the aggregate performance of branded firms vs independent firms and explore differential effects of information on performance across different types of firms and brands. In particular, I leverage the large and highly granular data on both revenue and reviews as well as the fact that many firms add, drop or switch brand affiliations in the sample period.
I find the following three main results. First, the amount of information consumers have on a specific outlet, measured in four separate ways, has a significantly larger positive effect on revenues of independent hotels than for branded hotels. Receiving more reviews, longer reviews, more unique terms, and more recent reviews all increase independent hotel revenues by more than branded hotels. This effect size is not uniform across the vertical quality dimension. It is mostly driven by low quality independent firms, which benefit the most from higher numbers of reviews. These firms are also the most negatively affected by negative ratings and high variance in ratings.
The marginal effect of a single review is quite small. In order to quantify the cumulative effect of reviews I next measure the aggregate change in the revenue gap between chain and independent firms from 2000-2015.
There exists a large advantage associated with umbrella branding, the result of which is a revenue premium of 25.1% over otherwise identical independent firms. This premium remains large but has fallen substantially over the years 2000-2015, from 31.8% to 19.3%. Again, the decline is not uniform and relates both to vertical differentiation and market size. It has fallen particularly far for low quality firms and firms in small or rural markets. Third, within branded hotels I find a shift in the relative importance of brand reputation versus individual product quality. The average correlation between revenue and brand-level reputation is decreasing over time and the correlation with property-level ratings is increasing over time.
Altogether these results suggest online reputation mechanisms have had a large impact on the value of branding, and that consumers value the quality signal branding provides particularly for low-quality and small market firms where the risk of an adverse experience is relatively high. That the brand premium has been less affected by online reputation mechanisms for high quality firms suggests that at higher quality levels, the value of branding may be more likely to stem from loyalty and specific mental associations such as the idiosyncratic nature of the service offered. These results also point to an increase in the relative importance of individual product quality and characteristics and a decrease in the relative importance of brand reputation. This has implications for the franchising model and umbrella branding more broadly.
Franchisee-franchisor relationships are based on royalty contracts designed to incentivize chain members to provide high quality. This incentive is becoming less important as spillovers across brand members diminish.
In addition, the overall value of joining a chain and in effect renting its brand name is falling, particularly at the low end of the quality scale.
This paper is the first to consider the implications of online reputation mechanisms on umbrella branding and franchising and the first to show directly that online reviews are decreasing the value of branding. This contributes to the literatures on branding on franchising by first empirically quantifying the value of branding and then using online reviews to show how much of this value relates to quality signaling and how this varies over types of brands. This paper also contributes to the literature on online word-of-mouth (WOM) by focusing on the implications of the information content of online reviews.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 1 I review the related literature and contribution.
In section 2 I describe the data collected and industry setting. In section 3 I show results on the impact of online reviews on different firm types. In section 4 results are presented quantifying the revenue premium earned by branded firms and showing this premium is declining over time. Section 5 presents results on the changing correlation between brand reputation and property level ratings with revenue. Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper relates to several literatures. The first studies branding, brand extension and the sources of brand value. This literature includes early theoretical work by Shapiro (1983) , Milgrom and Roberts (1986) , and Spence (1974) on the use of branding for reputation building and as a signal for quality. Sappington and Wernerfelt (1985) and Cabral (2000) show when and how firm reputations or brand associations transfer to new products. Park et al. (1986) present a framework under which brands develop reputations through product development and marketing communication. The brand then acts as a signal or heuristic cue to infer both quality and specific attributes (Maheswaran et al. (1992) .)
In recent theoretical work, Miklos-Thal (2012) considers firm incentives to link products through umbrella branding, and finds that this can arise endogenously without differences in firm skill level or key inputs, and that rational consumers come to expect a consistent quality level across products under the same brand.
Moorthy (2012) further develops our understanding of the conditions under which brand extension can signal product quality.
There is empirical support for the claim that consumers expectations of quality carry over within brands across different products. Erdem (1998) shows high correlation between consumers' quality perceptions of umbrella branded products. Further evidence is compiled in a secondary analysis in Bottomley and Holden (2001) . Some notable recent empirical works on brand values and umbrella branding include Ailawadi et al. (2003) on using a revenue premium to measure brand equity and Goldfarb et al. (2009) on measuring brand value in an equilibrium framework. Notably, Chen and Waldfogel (2006) finds that the presence of online information reduces brand preferences, showing that shoppers who use price comparison sites are less likely to purchase from branded retailers.
An important and widely used application of umbrella branding is business format franchising. Kosova and Lafontaine (2012) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) survey a variety of empirical work on business format franchising and franchised chains. This literature often implicitly recognizes the importance of quality reputation effects across chains. Tsai et al. (2015) studies the effects of rebranding using data on the hotel industry.
This paper also contributes to the literature on online word-of-mouth (WOM) and user generated content (UGC.) A number of papers, including Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) , have studied the impact of online reviews on product sales. Chintagunta et al. (2010) , Duan et al. (2013) , and Zhang and Zhu (2010) also study the relationship between online reviews and sales. You et al. (2015) and Floyd et al. (2014) survey additional research on this subject. In addition, Sun (2012) examines the joint relationship between average ratings and ratings variance with sales in the context of both vertical and horizontal differentiation, finding that high variance in ratings is associated with higher sales when the average rating is low. A closely related work is Luca (2011) , who uses a regression discontinuity design to study the marginal effect of Yelp.com star ratings on Seattle restaurants. He finds a significant positive relationship between average star rating and restaurant revenues, and notably finds this relationship is larger for unbranded restaurants than for chain restaurants.
Recently, Tirunillai and Tellis (2014) and Buschken and Allenby (2015) have suggested methods for analyzing and summarizing review text. Several recent papers study UGC and WOM specifically in the context of the hotel industry. These include Chevalier et al. (2016) and who study the impact of managerial replies on online ratings. Mayzlin et al. (2014) studies review manipulation and finds that hotels with a high incentive to fake reviews have higher ratings and their neighbors have more low ratings. Ghose et al. (2012) uses UGC from hotel reviews and other sources to study optimal ranking of search results.
Data and Setting
This section describes the data and industry setting. The unit of analysis throughout this paper is at the level of the individual property. Similarly, I define "firm" throughout at the level of the property because the vast majority of hotels are owned and managed by independent franchisees in these data. are in mid-sized markets, and 35% are in large markets.
The tax return data provides total revenue but not prices or bookings. To measure performance, I instead 4 The organizational structure of chain affiliated hotels can vary. In some cases, the chain both owns and operates the property, in other cases a franchisee owns the property but the chain has a contract to manage it. While I do observe these contracts, in nearly all firms in this sample, the chain neither owns nor operates the property. Instead, these roles are taken by local franchisees and the chain simply licenses its branding and provides the franchisee with a operating manual.
5 There are 7 large markets in the data: Austin, Arlington, Dallas, El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, and San Antonio. use daily revenue per available room, or "RevPar". This is the industry standard measure of performance, and is computed simply as revenue divided by capacity and the number of days in the reporting period.
Summary statistics can be seen in Table 1 . All revenue data are adjusted for inflation using 2006 as the base year. Average RevPar for the full sample is $39.7 and is substantially higher for branded firms and firms with higher AAA star ratings. One star firms average $23.9 per room per day while five star hotels average $345.6. In total, I observe $89.4 billion in revenues during the sample period. The industry is growing rapidly in Texas during this time, with over 2,100 new entrants compared to 408 exits. The largest segment by far is the 3 star segment, followed by 2 stars and 1 star.
Overall, 62% of hotels in the data are members of regional or national chains. For the remainder of this paper, for simplicity I will refer to these hotels as branded and non-chain members as unbranded or independent. Table 2 as separate, for example, despite both being members of Hilton Worldwide. In total, there are 70 distinct brands operating in Texas as defined at the individual brand level.
To supplement the panel of revenues, I collect ratings and reviews data from two major U.S. online travel platforms, TripAdvisor.com and Priceline.com. TripAdvisor was founded in 2000 as a travel search engine and aggregator. After several years, user reviews were added as a feature and quickly became the main driver of traffic. As of 2012 the site was receiving 65 million unique visitors per month. As Figure as Figure 2 shows. Summary statistics on all variables used in the paper are presented in Table 4 .
Measuring the Impact of Online Reputation Mechanisms
In this section I present the first main result, which measures the differential effect of online reputation mechanisms on revenue of branded and independent firms. Branding serves several functions, but a primary function is to signal quality to consumers who are unfamiliar with the good or service. The rapid expansion of online reputation mechanisms thus has potentially large implications for branded firms. The goal then is not to measure a causal effect of average rating but to measure the effect of quantity of information. To measure this , I construct four related measures of the amount of information available for each firm: number of reviews, number of total characters in posted reviews, total number of unique words posted, and presence of recent reviews. I then look to measure the effect of these variables interacted with firm type to test if online reputation sites have a differential effect on branded versus independent firms.
Empirical Strategy
In this section, the key parameter of interest is the difference between the effects of quantity of information from online WOM on independent versus chain hotel outcomes. Measuring causal effects of online WOM variables can present an empirical challenge. The same underlying firm qualities that drive reviews also drive revenue. I take a four part strategy to eliminate these concerns. This strategy consists of property fixed effects, detailed measures of time-varying property quality, lagged dependent variables and lagged independent variables.
In addition, it is important to note that the key object of interest in this section is an interaction term, specifically whether the size of the effect of amount of information on revenue is larger or smaller for independent versus branded firms. While I believe the controls described below rule out bias in the main effect, any real concern has to come from bias in the interaction term.
First, I take advantage of the large size and granularity of the dataset available by including fixed effects to control for the main sources of potential endogeneity. Specifically, I use property level fixed effects to control for unobserved time invariant hotel quality variables such as location, size, layout and major attributes. I also include owner/manager fixed effects, as many hotels change management during the sample period and many owners have multiple hotels. I include year and month fixed effects to control for time trends and seasonality and I interact these with market type to allow for different seasonal patterns or time trends in different markets.
While these control for trends and seasonality and time invariant hotel characteristics, hotel service quality may change over time. To account for this I include the average star rating on TripAdvisor and Priceline as a time-varying measure of quality. Several researchers in recent years have attempted to measure the causal impact of average online star rating on sales. This presents a significant empirical challenge as average star ratings are determined largely by underlying quality. In response, they have developed strategies for this problem that typically assume fixed product quality and some use quasi-random variation including in how ratings are presented to consumers (Luca (2011) ), in cross-platform variation in ratings (Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) ), and in the sequential rollout across markets (Chintagunta et al. (2010) ). I treat the noise in ratings as standard measurement error. By using star ratings as a useful proxy for quality and not attempting to also measure a separate causal effect, I avoid this source of potential endogeneity.
6
In addition, once many reviews have been posted the average rating may be slow to adjust to short term changes in quality, and so I include as further controls the average rating of the most recent 5 reviews on
TripAdvisor and Priceline as well as the average of all reviews posted in the past month as a moving average measure of quality. I also include the standard deviation of ratings from both sites.
Finally, I use the presence of rich text data from the posted reviews to control for time-varying quality by searching review text for use of the words "renovations," "construction," and variations on these terms.
I use the results of this to construct two variables, a dummy for whether a hotel is currently undergoing renovations and a dummy for whether is has undergone renovations in the past year. Altogether, these variables should capture time-varying elements of quality to go along with property fixed effects. I also include the average Revpar of each hotel's competitors in the same market as a measure of market level demand shocks. As a final control, I include a lagged dependent variable to capture any other time-varying unobservable revenue determinants and improve model fit. Given the presence of property fixed effects, probably the largest source of potential bias in the interaction term from time-variation comes from a hotel's decision whether to leave or join a chain in the sample period. I test this concern by separately estimating the following results with and without these firms and find no difference.
After eliminating all time-invariant factors and including a broad set of controls for both long-term and short-term changes in firm quality, there still may remain some potential endogeneity in the volume of reviews from short term demand shocks. These shocks could increase the number of reviews, characters or unique terms in a month as well as revenue. I eliminate this by using only the lagged value of each of these variables.
This is also useful because many hotel stays are booked in advance. This eliminates concerns of a short term omitted variable correlated with both revenue and number of reviews. If this omitted variable was serially correlated, however, using lagged values may not be sufficient. Fortunately, this condition is testable. I follow the test for serial correlation in panel data suggested by Wooldridge (2002) . 7 Conditional on the same covariates used in the specification shown in Table 6 , the test shows no evidence of serial correlation in the remaining idiosyncratic term. For more discussion of this test and other tests used to rule out endogeneity see Appendix A.
Marginal Effects
To measure the effects of online information on different firm types, I construct four related measures of quantity of information available: total number of reviews posted, total number of characters in the stock of reviews, total number of unique words in the stock of reviews, and a dummy for whether or not a review has been posted in the most recent month. In each case the variable of interest is lagged one month to avoid simultaneity and the focus is on the interaction with firm type. For each of the four tests I estimate:
Log(RevP ar imt ) = x imt β 1 +β 2 c it +β 3 #reviews i,t−1 +β 4 c it X#reviews i,t−1 +time t +owner j +hotel i + imt , where i denotes hotel, m denotes market, and t denotes month. Firm characteristics are represented by x imt , which includes the number and type of competitors in each market, age, capacity, average star rating on TripAdvisor and Priceline overall and in the short term, standard deviation of each set of ratings, and the average RevPAR of the firms in the same market as a control for market level demand. Fixed effects for time, owner and the individual property are also included as well as interactions between month fixed effect and market. The main effect of number of reviews is captured by β 3 , the effect of chain affiliation is captured by β 2 , and the interaction between these is captured by β 4 , the main object of interest in this section. Table 5 shows the results from these tests. Column 1 shows the main result on the effect of number of reviews measured separately for chain and independent firms. I present the results in this way because the interpretation is clearer, but having separate coefficients for chain and independent firms is mathematically equivalent to the interaction as described in equation 1 and I follow this convention throughout. The marginal effect of one additional review is positive for both types of firms but is roughly twice as large for independent firms. Column 2 shows results for number of total characters posted about a hotel, after controlling for number of reviews posted. Conditional on number of reviews, the marginal effect of more characters is positive for both firm types, indicating longer reviews do provide more information than shorter reviews.
The effect is roughly 5 times larger for independent hotels than chain hotels.
Column 3 show results for number of unique words. If a new review contains only terms that have previously been posted in past reviews, it will not add to this measure. These types of reviews, which add little additional content, may not be very informative. In addition, most reviews sites allow consumers to search review text, and with more unique terms in the stock of reviews it will be more likely they will find the specific information they are interested in. The result is that, conditional on number of reviews, having more unique words posted has a significant positive effect for independent firms, although not for chain firms.
Fourth, I consider different effects of recent reviews versus old and "stale" reviews. This uses a dummy for whether or not at least one review has been posted in the most recent month. Recent reviews should be more informative than older reviews because they would contain information about any changes to quality or service that had occurred recently. The result is a positive effect of recent reviews for both firm types, although again the effect is much higher for independent hotels than chain hotels.
While these measures are correlated with one another, we nevertheless see a very consistent result across four different ways of measuring the information content available to consumers through online reputation mechanisms. In each case, this information has a larger positive effect for independent than chain hotels.
I next consider how these effects vary over brand quality and market size. Related to the theoretical literature on umbrella branding, we would expect information effects to be strongest for lower quality brands or in settings where consumer risk aversion is high. Figures 4 and 5 show the effect is not uniform across quality levels or market types and in fact the difference is quite dramatic. Figure 4 shows the effect broken down by AAA stars. It shows that both the overall effect and the gap between branded and independent hotels is primarily driven by lower quality hotels, where more reviews have substantially increased the 13 Figure 4 : The Marginal Effect of Number of Reviews by AAA Rating
Note: This figure plots the coefficients from the regression described in equation 1 where number of reviews is interacted with AAA ratings. All independent firm coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Only the coefficient on 3 star chain firms is significant. Note: This figure plots the coefficients from the regression described in equation 1 where number of reviews is interacted with market type. All coefficients are significant at the 5% level except for large market chains, which is not.
revenues of low quality independent firms in contrast to branded firms. Figure 5 shows that the effect is largest for both firm types in small markets but particularly for independent hotels in small markets. Both these results are consistent with expectations.
Aggregate Implications for Brands
In this section I present the second main result. We have seen that online reputation mechanisms have a larger effect on independent firm revenue than branded firm revenue, but the marginal effect of a single To test this, I calculate the aggregate revenue premium earned by branded firms compared to equivalent independent firms and track its value over time. Specifically, the model for RevPar that I consider is:
where x imt denotes firm characteristics and includes the number and type of competitors in each market, age, capacity, average star rating on TripAdvisor and Priceline, standard deviation of each set of ratings, and the average RevPAR of the firms in the same market as a control for market level demand, c it indicates whether a firm is a member of a chain in period t, and market, time, owner j ,and hotel i are fixed effects. The ultimate object of interest is δ c , which is the remaining effect on revenue of chain affiliation after controlling for firm and market characteristics.
It is important to correct for potential correlation between chain affiliation and unobserved factors that impact revenue. For instance, if chain hotels were more likely to be built at better locations, this would cause upward bias in the estimate of the chain premium. Fortunately, 663 hotels add or drop chain affiliation in the sample period. 8 Because we observe these switches, I can include firm fixed effects and estimate δ c off the subpopulation of switchers. No firms that add or drop chain affiliation change their star rating, indicating that switches occur within well-defined quality tiers, rather than accompanying a significant change in underlying firm quality. Along with superficial changes in branding, joining a chain requires following a set of standardized operating procedures. 9 This identification strategy is the same as that of Tsai et al. (2015) and Hollenbeck (2015) , who also study branding in the hotel industry. 10 A set of robustness checks on this strategy is presented in Appendix B.
Results from this estimation are in column 1 of Table 6 . The FE regression suggests branded firms earn a quite substantial revenue premium compared with equivalent independent firms. The estimated chain premium is 25.2% of RevPar or roughly $170, 000 per year for an 80 room property.
This brand premium is the average over the 15 years in the sample. Of more interest is how the revenue premium varies from year to year, which can be measured by interacting the brand effect with year dummies.
We are interested in seeing whether or not this premium is falling over time as online reputation mechanisms increase consumer information. The results can be seen in Figure 6 and Figure 7 . The brand revenue premium, expressed as a percentage, steadily decreases over the decade, from 31.8% in 2000 to just under 19.3% in 2015.
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There is heterogeneity across both firm and market type in how the brand premium has fallen. As shown in Figure 6 , the brand premium falls roughly 12 percentage points for 1 and 2 star firms, but with a much smaller trend for 3-5 star firms. This is noteworthy and consistent with the results in section 3. It suggests a bifurcation in the value of branding, where the value to low quality firms of branding is decreasing as the ability to signal a reliable quality level becomes less necessary. For high quality firms, the growth of loyalty programs or other factors may offset this effect. It is interesting to note that in percentage terms, the average brand premium during the whole sample is significantly lower for 2 star firms than for both 1 and 3 star firms. It may be that business travelers value brands for loyalty programs and reliability at the 3 star level and price-sensitive consumers value chains at the 1 star level out of risk aversion, but that for 2 star limited service hotels brands have little to offer.
For firms in small markets, the brand premium has fallen dramatically, from 25% to 6.9%. Similarly, in medium-sized towns and suburban markets it has fallen from 33.4% to 13.7%. By contrast, in denser urban areas, it has fallen only from 34.5% to 25.9%. Since urban markets are the largest and fastest growing markets, this has muted the overall pattern somewhat, but this result further suggests that firms about whom consumers are especially uninformed or risk averse have been most impacted by the change in information.
To investigate this further, Figures 8 and 9 show the raw trends in revenue for branded and unbranded firms, respectively. These revenues are adjusted for inflation and then normalized to their value in 2000.
Chain firms appear more sensitive to the business cycle, perhaps due to a greater reliance on business travelers. Between 2000-2015, average inflation-adjusted chain revenue has declined for all quality categories except 3 star, which has stayed level. For 1 and 2 star firms, revenues decline 21% and 12%, respectively.
For unbranded firms, on the other hand, revenues have trended upwards over the period 2000-2015. The increase ranges from 8.4% for 3 star firms to 41.3% for 4 and 5 star firms. The combination of trends we see in Figures 8 and 9 suggest that the decline in the brand premium has been caused by both an increase in performance by unbranded hotels and a decrease by branded hotels, but with more of the effect resulting from an increase by unbranded firms.
Brand Reputation and Property Level Performance
This section presents the third main result. The previous results suggest online reputation mechanisms have a larger effect on independent hotels than branded hotels and that this cumulative impact of this has substantially reduced the revenue premium associated with branding. These results suggest that quality signaling is an important source of brand value. Within the subset of branded hotels, however, I test for an 11 This result does not appear to be caused by increasing numbers of chain competitors, as it is robust to different specifications that include the number of chain firms in each market, the share of chain firms, and the full type distribution in revenue estimates. In addition, while the US as a whole experienced a large recession in 2008-9, large regions in Texas were experiencing an economic boom at this time due to new gas production. Comparing this figure for counties with and without falling employment show no significant difference, suggesting business cycle dynamics do not play a major role in this result. product quality. The premise of umbrella branding and franchising is that the reputation developed over existing products can be extended to signal quality of new products. As more outside information becomes available, however, the value of this signal should decrease. If this is true it has substantial implications for brand extension and product development. To test if this hypothesis is supported empirically, I restrict attention to branded firms and measure the relative importance of brand reputation and individual property quality for outcomes as well as how this changes over time.
To do so, I include the average TripAdvisor rating of all chain members as an independent variable alongside the average rating of the individual outlet. I treat average chain rating as a proxy for overall brand reputation. I continue to use average property-level rating as a measure of product quality and interact both of these measures with time and plot the coefficients in Figure 10 .
The top left plot in Figure 10 shows the results for the full sample of branded hotels. Notably, the coefficient on mean property-level rating is increasing over time and the correlation with chain-level rating is decreasing over time. Looking at all six plots, we see that the increase in correlation between outlet rating and revenue is fairly consistent across all firm and market types, rising from an initial level of roughly .05 at the beginning of the sample period to roughly .20 at the end. For the full sample, the coefficient on chain rating decreases from near .30 to roughly .20, but with wide heterogeneity across firm and market type.
Comparing the different plots we see that the fall is most pronounced for low-quality chains, as measured by AAA ratings of 1 and 2 stars with little change for high quality brands. The decline in the correlation with brand reputation is also most pronounced in small and mid-sized markets. In large markets and for high-quality chains, the coefficient on chain ratings begins higher and shows little decline.
These results show a substantial decline in importance of brand reputation in determining individual property performance, and an increase in importance of individual property quality. The pattern in these results is consistent with the evidence in sections 2 and 3 regarding the heterogeneity of these effects across the vertical quality spectrum and across market size. For high quality chains, there has been little decline in the correlation between hotel performance and brand reputation. For small and rural markets, chain reputation is more important than individual property quality and, while this has fallen, it remains true at the end of the sample period. For mid-sized and urban markets, however, overall brand rating has decreased below property rating.
Conclusions
The previous sections have shown that the value of umbrella branding in the hotel industry has fallen significantly beginning in the mid-2000's and that this fall is at least partially due to information from online reputation mechanisms. This result is distinct from much prior research on online word-of-mouth that has sought to measure a causal effect of average online rating. Instead, I study the effect of amount of information
Figure 10: Increasing Importance of Outlet Ratings
Note: This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of log(RevPAR) on average chain-level ratings and outlet-level ratings interacted with year, along with firm and market characteristics and firm and time fixed effects. Low-quality chains are defined as those brands with 1 or 2 AAA stars, and high-quality chains as those with 3 or higher. 95% confidence intervals indicated with dotted lines.
available to consumers on the difference in performance between branded and non-branded firms. Because average online ratings are representations of firm quality, measuring their causal effect required exogenous variation in how they were presented to users. After constructing a large and detailed panel of online reviews and firm revenues, I can take advantage of the comprehensive nature of this data in two ways. First, it allows construction of a detailed and multifaceted set of variables measuring the amount of information available to consumers over time. Second, it allows for detailed and multifaceted variables measuring time-varying quality of each firm. Because the goal is to measure firm quality, average ratings are not endogenous but are highly useful proxies for quality and how it varies over time.
The final product of this is three main results. The marginal effect of additional information on revenue is substantially higher for independent hotels than chain hotels. The revenue premium earned by chain hotels has fallen by roughly half between 2000 and 2015. And the correlation between performance and brand reputation has fallen substantially while increasing for individual property quality. But this effect is not uniform across brands, markets, or properties. This has implications for entrepreneurs considering making a large investment in a brand name via franchising fees, as the decline in brand value has mostly occurred among lower quality, limited service properties and those in rural and suburban markets. While it has fallen slightly, the value of branding for higher quality and urban firms remains high.
On a broader level, the declining value of branding as information becomes more readily available has potentially large implications for the franchisee-franchisor relationship. As Blair and Lafontaine (2005) describe, franchising contracts are premised on the negative externality involved in chains that is analogous to that in umbrella branding. 12 Each new chain partner has an incentive to free ride off the reputation of its partners and offer low quality, knowing that it will not bear the full cost of this. As a result, franchise contracts are composed of a fixed fee and a recurring share of revenue. Royalties typically range from 7−10% of revenue, accounting for roughly half of the average revenue premium earned by chain-affiliated franchises in 2015. But as the value of branding decreases in aggregate, the fees charged to be a member of a chain may be forced to decrease as well, particularly for brands that target the limited service segment. In addition, as the quality of the individual property becomes more important and the reputation of the brand as a whole becomes less important, the free rider problem is lessened. Thus, contracts with a strong monetary incentive to maintain high quality should be less necessary and could be fazed out in settings where they produce inefficient outcomes.
Business format franchising is widely used across retail and service industries and the effects of online reputation mechanisms are likely to vary based on firm and market type. Several results in this study point to one possible mechanism explaining the declining premium associated with branding. At the low end of the quality spectrum, and in small markets or settings with little potential for repeat business, uncertainty is high and consumers exhibit risk aversion with respect to negative outcomes. This uncertainty and risk aversion likely explain much of the value of branding in those settings and as more information has become 12 See also Lal (1990) .
available through alternative channels, this value is significantly diminished. For these firms, increasing the amount of online word of mouth is associated with a substantial increase in revenue. For higher quality firms, the value associated with branding has been less affected by new sources of information, indicating it may stem more from loyalty and signaling specific amenities or distinguishing features. In the case of hotels, then, high quality brands might focus more efforts on developing distinctive offerings both at the chain-wide level and at individual properties.
In general, the increase in information available to consumers has significant implications for the future of umbrella branding. The spillover of reputation across products sold under the same brand should decrease, and with it the value of branding as a whole. Whether brands should react to this decrease in spillovers by investing less in quality of individual products or whether they should invest more in individual product quality and less in brand reputation remains an open question beyond the scope of this paper. But the results here do suggest this is likely to vary over the average quality level of the brand as well as the type of market or setting they are found in. Note: This table includes additional measures of information that incorporate the text of reviews. In every case the dependent variable is Log(RevPar). Column (1) is the primary specification from the paper and is included as a benchmark. Column (2) still includes the lagged number of reviews but adds the number of total characters for chain and independent hotels separately. Column (3) adds the total number of unique words posted in reviews. This specification excludes hotels with fewer than 5 reviews posted. Column (4) includes a dummy variable for whether or not the hotel had a review posted in the most recent month. Column (5) adds separate variables for short, medium and long reviews defined as containing {0 − 500, 500 − 1000, 1000+} characters. This table presents estimates of the brand premium as a percent of firm revenue, interacted with year, by firm type and market type. In all columns the dependent variable is log(RevPAR). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the property level.
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A Appendix A
This Appendix presents robustness checks on the results in section 3. The object of interest in this section is the effect on revenue of the interaction between the amount of information in online reputation mechanisms and whether the firm is branded or independent. The argument that this interaction is measured correctly is based on a broad set of controls for potential endogeneity.
Ultimately, there are six potential sources of bias in equation 1 I eliminate concerns 1, 2, and 3 by including property and owner fixed effects to eliminate time-invariant quality and service features, market level month and year dummies to account for time trends and seasonality.
For concern 4, I include a a set of eight variables that measure time-varying quality using information from online quality ratings.
Concern 5 is that advertising campaigns might increase both revenue and number of reviews over a medium-term period. I test for this using average chain partner RevPar. Because marketing activities are coordinated at the chain level and because activities like advertising have spillovers across chain partners, controlling for average chain partner performance should capture any medium-term demand driven by marketing. Results from including this can be seen in column 6 of Table 7 . Including this measure does not change the main results. In addition, effects of advertising campaigns should be captured by the lagged dependent variable.
Concern 6 is that offline word of mouth is correlated with online word of mouth and is likely to affect revenues. In addition to including time dummies to capture any trends, I also test for this concern by including the number of reviews of chain partners from outside the focal hotel's market. The result of this test can be seen in column 5 of Table 7 . The coefficient on number of reviews of chain partners is very close to zero and not significant. Including this measure also seems to strengthen the main empirical result, as it causes the coefficient on the number of reviews for independent hotels to increase.
After including these controls, there still exists potential simultaneity in short term demand shocks that could generate upward bias in the coefficient on number of reviews. While this would not necessarily bias the interaction term that is the object of interest, it is still worth testing to rule out bias of this sort. The concern is that after controlling for all the factors described above there is serial correlation in the remaining idiosyncratic component of revenue. This type of serial correlation can be tested for. The test follows Wooldridge (2002) and accounts for fixed effects such as the property fixed effects I include throughout. The results from these tests are shown in Table 8 . The error term after accounting only for property fixed effects 30 and basic characteristics such as age and capacity shows strong serial correlation. Including month dummies to account for seasonality reduces serial correlation but it is still significant. Adding mean competitor
RevPar as a measure of market level shocks significantly reduces serial correlation to the extent that it is not significant and adding further controls for seasonality, short term quality changes, and the lagged dependent variable go even further to rule out a significant serial correlation in the remaining idiosyncratic term. The result of these tests is to rule out simultaneity bias. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
Note: This table presents a set of robustness tests for the main parameter of interest, the marginal effect of lagged # of reviews on independent versus branded hotels. In every case the dependent variable is Log(RevPar). Column (1) contains the primary specification as a benchmark. Column (2) uses only the number of Priceline reviews. Column (3) uses only the number of TripAdvisor reviews. Column (4) includes the total number of reviews of competing hotels in the same market where market is defined as city. Column (5) includes the total number of reviews of hotels in the same brand or chain as the hotel of interest. Column (6) includes as a control mean RevPar of hotels in the same brand or chain as the hotel of interest. Note: This table presents the results of the test for serial correlation from Wooldridge (2002) . The p-value shown corresponds to the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
B Appendix B
This Appendix presents robustness checks for the results in section 4. Equation 2 measures the aggregate revenue premium earned by branded firms, and relies on hotels that add or drop affiliation with national chains during the sample period. One concern is that observing revenues before and after a hotel joins or leaves a chain may not be valid because hotels that leave chains may be underperforming in terms of revenue and that those that join chains may be overperforming (in the opposite case, that chain leavers are overperformers, the arguments presented here are equally valid.)
First, the nature of these switches is that they take place within already well-defined quality categories.
In no cases does a firm that adds or drops chain affiliation see their AAA star rating change subsequently.
These ratings correspond to basic physical amenities and offerings, such as breakfast being offered, presence of a pool, fitness center or conference facilities, as well as room layout and quality of construction. These elements are difficult and time-consuming to change and are not changing at the time of these switches, as evidenced by the lack of AAA rating changes in the data.
Second, more modest changes in quality that may precede or follow the addition or subtraction of branding are already controlled for using the TripAdvisor ratings, Priceline ratings, and the short term measures of each (the average of the 5 most recent ratings from both sites as well as the average of all ratings in the previous month.) If there are short term changes in things like service quality, on average these should capture that.
Third, while the estimates of the brand premium use the full data, measuring the full effect of the switch over many years while including property fixed effects, a more extreme version of the fixed effects argument can be used to insure this is not about reverse causality. In Table 9 below, I test for changes in revenue looking only at the quarter before and quarter after each switch occurred. This should, as much as possible, isolate the effects of the brand switch and remove longer term effects of changes in managerial quality or other factors. Column 2 compares the brand premium estimated using this very short time window to the estimates from the paper that use the full dataset and the results are not significantly different. While the data is too sparse to use this short-term window approach to measure the changes over time in the brand premium for different brand qualities, it is a useful robustness check to the methodology.
Fourth, an additional robustness check for concerns about reverse causation is to include leads or lags of the switch. If it is the case that national chains are dropping the underperforming hotels, and that the brand premium merely reflects this, than a one year lead of the switch should capture the difference in revenue and the variable measuring the actual switch should not be significant. Column 3 shows the results of this test. The one year lead is positive and significant, but the estimated chain premium falls only from 24.8% to 21.5%.
Fifth, I find that 4.8% of hotels have a change in the number of rooms available or the owner/manager within one year of the switch taking place. These might pose the concern that major renovations are taking place roughly concurrent with the switch. In columns 5 and 7 of Table 9 , I include only at the subsamples 34 with and without these changes taking place. The results are very similar to the sample of switching hotels that maintain their current owner/manager and number of rooms.
On the whole, I believe these tests strongly suggest reverse causality is not driving the results on the brand premium, and that the brand premium measured in the revenue data and the steep fall over time in this premium for certain brand types are well measured. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001
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Note: This table presents a set of robustness tests on the measurement of the brand premium. In each case the dependent variable is Log(RevPar). Column (1) shows results from the full sample. Column (2) excludes all data not from firms that add/drop chain affiliation as well as all time periods outside the quarter before and quarter after the switch occurs. It also excludes the quarter during which the switch occurs. Column (3) includes a variable that is a one year lead of chain affiliation status. Column (4) excludes firms that have a change in number of rooms available within one year of adding/dropping chain affiliation. Column (5) only includes firms that change room number within one year of adding/dropping chain affiliation. Column (6) excludes firms that have a change in franchisee (as noted by their tax ID) within one year of adding/dropping chain affiliation. Column (7) only includes firms that have a change in franchisee (as noted by their tax ID) within one year of adding/dropping chain affiliation. AAA ratings are generally excluded because no AAA ratings change within one year before or after the year a switch occurs.
